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When Judges Lie (and When They Should) 
Paul Butler† 
What should a judge do when she must apply law that she 
believes is fundamentally unjust?1 The problem is as old as 
slavery. It is as contemporary as the debates about capital pun-
ishment and abortion rights. In a seminal essay, Robert Cover 
described four choices that a judge has in such cases. She can 
(1) apply the law even though she thinks it is immoral; 
(2) openly reject the law; (3) resign; or (4) subvert the law by 
pretending that it supports the outcome that the judge desires, 
even though the judge does not actually believe that it does.2 
This Article demonstrates that the fourth choice—judicial 
“subversion” or lying—is far more common than is openly ac-
knowledged. This Article identifies some cases in which judges 
intentionally have framed the law to achieve a particular out-
come. This Article also suggests that this kind of lie is occa-
sionally justified. Sometimes it is the best of the imperfect 
choices that judges have when they are confronted with unjust 
 
†  Carville Dickinson Benson Research Professor of Law, George Wash-
ington University. B.A., Yale University; J.D., Harvard University. Drafts of 
this Article were presented at faculty workshops at Georgetown Law School, 
Georgia State Law School, George Washington University Law School, North-
eastern Law School, and UCLA Law School. I owe a special debt of gratitude 
to Hope Lewis, Dan Solove, and Bob Tuttle. Thanks also to Stephen Bain-
bridge, Monroe Freedman, Mitu Gulati, Alex Kozinski, Spencer Overton, Ellen 
Podgor, William Rubenstein, and Gerry Spann. Todd Chatman, Michael De-
Bernardis, Adrienne Lawrence, Eduardo Rodriguez, and Ravn Whitington pro-
vided first-rate research assistance. Copyright © 2007 by Paul Butler. 
 1. “Morality” is a word with religious or natural law connotations that 
make some people uncomfortable. Partly in an effort to avoid this discomfort, I 
will use the terms “unjust,” “immoral,” and “unfair” interchangeably. I recog-
nize that the words “unjust” and “unfair” contain an implicit moral (non-legal) 
judgment. 
 2. See Robert M. Cover, Book Review, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1005−08 
(1968) [hereinafter Cover, Book Review] (reviewing RICHARD HILDRETH, 
ATROCIOUS JUDGES: LIVES OF JUDGES INFAMOUS AS TOOLS OF TYRANTS AND 
INSTRUMENTS OF OPPRESSION (1856)). 
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law. This Article recommends judicial lying only when it will 
thwart extreme injustice—a recommendation that, if followed, 
would reduce the subversion that is now endemic in our justice 
system. 
Legal culture resists extreme responses, even to serious 
miscarriages of justice. In the legal canon, for example, a story 
is sometimes told about Robert Cover’s journey as a scholar. 
His first essay called on American judges to “interfere with the 
[Vietnam] [W]ar effort,” and if they could not, to resign.3 Cover 
wrote those words as an Assistant Professor-Designate in an 
essay published by the Columbia Law Review. 
Several years later Cover wrote Justice Accused.4 Now a 
full Professor at Columbia Law School, Cover explained that 
his essay was a “short polemic” that had been criticized by sev-
eral of his colleagues on the faculty of Columbia Law School.5 
He thanked those colleagues for alerting him “to all the com-
plexities of the process of complicity.”6 
Justice Accused is not nearly as polemical as the Columbia 
Law Review essay. Although his subject matter—slavery—is a 
more extreme example of immorality than the Vietnam War, 
Cover is less certain about what judges should have done. In 
the end, he is barely critical of judges who enforced the Fugitive 
Slave Law.7 
The canonical story ends with a positive description of 
Cover’s evolution. His growth from precocious student to ma-
ture scholar allowed him to appreciate the complexity of the ju-
dicial role. The moral of the story is that for members of the le-
gal community, extremism in the defense of liberty is a vice. 
Moderation in the defense of justice is a virtue.8 
 
 3. See id. at 1008. 
 4. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDI-
CIAL PROCESS (1975) [hereinafter COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED]. 
 5. Id. at xi. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the 
Themes of Robert M. Cover’s Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 45 (1989) 
(“Cover stops short of drawing any explicit, normative conclusions about the 
proper judicial response to the moral-formal dilemma.”).  
 8. I corrupt Barry Goldwater’s famous lines in his speech accepting the 
Republican nomination for President in 1964: “Extremism in the defense of 
liberty is no vice. And . . . moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.” 
JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF PASSAGES, 
PHRASES, AND PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND MOD-
ERN LITERATURE 355 n.1 (Justin Kaplan ed., 17th ed. 2002). 
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I agree with the descriptive part of the story but not its 
moral.9 Cover’s demurral evidences more a crisis of confidence 
than a sophisticated understanding of the judicial role. When a 
person is confronted with injustice and she has the power to 
prevent it, hand-wringing is an ineffectual response; it begets 
the “judicial complicity in tyranny” that Cover condemned in 
his essay about judges during the Vietnam War.10 One objective 
of this Article is to illustrate why and when extreme injustice 
in the law warrants more than a moderate response. 
Part I of this Article puts the issue in historical context, 
and in its most sympathetic light, by considering the dilemma 
of abolitionist judges forced to interpret the law of slavery. Of-
ten the decision the judge made determined whether a human 
being was free or enslaved. Part II describes contemporary ex-
amples of subversion by judges. Part III begins to make the 
case that subversion is sometimes justified by describing the 
insufficiencies of the alternatives. Part IV explains that a prin-
cipled theory that allows judges to depart from rules is not as 
radical as it initially seems. It describes influential theories of 
adjudication, and the laws of other countries, that grant judges 
this power. Part V sets forth a moral theory of subversion. It 
recommends a way for judges ethically to mediate conflicts be-
tween law and morality. It also anticipates and responds to ob-
jections to the theory. Recognizing that subversion is a contro-
versial strategy, this Article concludes with an argument 
against symbolic or moderate responses to serious injustice. 
I.  SUBVERSION AND THE LAW OF SLAVERY   
During the antebellum period of U.S. history, disputes 
sometimes arose about the legal status of a person. Northern 
judges, for example, had to determine whether someone was, in 
the eyes of the law, a slave. These cases frequently involved en-
forcement of the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850, which 
 
 9. I am not the first scholar to dissent from this moral or to criticize 
Cover’s “evolution.” See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Book Review, 76 COLUM. L REV 
350, 356 (1976) (characterizing the conclusion of Justice Accused as “strangely 
tame . . . for someone whose decision to write the book was born of a 1968 po-
lemic in which he characterized judicial complicity in the Vietnam crimes as 
the equivalent of judicial acquiescence in the injustices of Negro slavery”); E. 
Nathaniel Gates, Justice Stillborn: Lies, Lacunae, Incommensurability, and 
the Judicial Role, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 971, 976 (1997) (book review) (describ-
ing Justice Accused as “singularly unhelpful in clarifying the role that moral-
ity should play in judging”). 
 10. Cover, Book Review, supra note 2, at 1004. 
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required federal officers to assist in the return of escaped 
slaves.11 Judges usually applied the law in a way that sup-
ported the maintenance of slavery, e.g., by forcing blacks who 
had escaped to the North to return to the South. Abolitionist 
judges who ruled this way sometimes explained that they be-
lieved that this was the result the law required—even if they 
also believed the result was immoral. 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, for example, 
faced a conflict between law and justice and chose the law.12 
Story was an abolitionist, but in Prigg v. Pennsylvania he wrote 
an opinion invalidating a Pennsylvania law that established 
procedural protections for people who had been kidnapped by 
slave-catchers.13 Justice Story’s opinion had two consequences, 
neither of them humane. The first was to condemn Margaret 
Morgan and her children to a life of slavery. The other was to 
empower slave-catchers across the United States by invalidat-
ing the anti-kidnapping laws that many northern states had 
established.14 After Prigg, Story wrote to a friend, “You know 
full well that I have ever been opposed to slavery. But I take 
my standard of duty as a judge from the Constitution.”15 
Lemuel Shaw, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, also chose the law. Shaw’s anti-slavery 
views were so well-known that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
had actually questioned his ability to judge such cases impar-
tially.16 This concern was bolstered by Shaw’s decision in 
Commonwealth v. Aves, in which he held that a slave brought 
by his master to Massachusetts gained his freedom.17 
In Thomas Sims’s Case, Shaw addressed the issue of 
whether the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was constitutional.18 
 
 11. See Act of September 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462 (1850) (repealed 1864); Act 
of February 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302 (1793), amended by Act of September 18, 
1850, 9 Stat. 462 (1850). 
 12. This version of Story’s dilemma is based on a comprehensive account 
by Nathaniel Gates. See Gates, supra note 9, at 985−1000. 
 13. 41 U.S. 539, 673 (1842); see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. The Pennsylvania 
law established procedural protections for people who had been kidnapped by 
slave-catchers. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 543−46. 
 14. See Gates, supra note 9, at 1000. 
 15. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 4, at 119 (quoting Letter from 
Joseph Story to Ezekiel Bacon (Nov. 19, 1842), reprinted in LIFE AND LETTERS 
OF JOSEPH STORY 431 (William W. Story ed., Boston, Charles C. Little and 
James Brown 1851)). 
 16. Id. at 250 (citing State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368, 376−77 (1845)). 
 17. 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 193 (1836). 
 18. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 285, 285, 302−08 (1851). 
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Many awaited Shaw’s analysis of this issue with particular in-
terest. As historian Leonard Levy notes, “[i]t was notorious that 
no fugitive slave had ever been returned from Boston . . . . It 
had become a matter of pride, not alone in the South, that a fu-
gitive should be seized in Boston and taken back to slavery.”19 
Shaw wrote a careful opinion holding that the Fugitive 
Slave Act of 1850 was constitutional.20 His was one of the first 
pronouncements on the issue.  
Story and Shaw both believed that slavery was immoral.21 
Their “private” morality did not, apparently, inform their judg-
ing.22 There are two different ways of evaluating a judge who 
chooses law when she faces what Cover described as the 
“moral-formal dilemma.”23 One is that she acts heroically when 
 
 19. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF 
JUSTICE SHAW 91−92 (1957). In an earlier case a slave named Shadrach was 
subject to a proceeding at the Boston courthouse to determine whether he was 
a fugitive. Abolitionist Boston citizens went to the courthouse, seized him, and 
sent him to freedom in Canada. This case received national attention, includ-
ing from the President, who condemned the actions of Shadrach’s emancipa-
tors. See id. at 87−90. 
 20. See Thomas Sims’s Case, 61 Mass (7 Cush.) at 302−08. Shaw wrote: 
The principle of adhering to judicial precedent, especially that of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, in a case depending upon the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, and thus placed within 
their special and final jurisdiction, is absolutely necessary to the 
peace, union and harmonious action of the state and general govern-
ments. The preservation of both, with their full and entire powers, 
each in its proper sphere, was regarded by the framers of the Consti-
tution, and has ever since been regarded, as essential to the peace, 
order and prosperity of all the United States. 
Id. at 310. 
He also offered a long explanation for the existence of slavery law, writing 
that “[t]he principle is, that although slavery and the slave trade are contrary 
to justice and natural right, yet each nation, in this respect, may establish its 
own law, within its own territory.” Id. at 313. Despite his personal feelings 
about slavery, Shaw wrote, “it seems to be the duty of all judges and magis-
trates to expound and apply these provisions in the Constitution and laws of 
the United States; and in this spirit it behooves all persons, bound to obey the 
laws of the United States, to consider and regard them.” Id. at 319. 
 21. But see generally Mark Tushnet, Book Review, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
168 (1976) (reviewing COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 4). 
 22. I say “apparently” because some scholars think that Story’s decision in 
Prigg was ordained not so much by blind application of the “rule of law” but 
rather by his belief in “unionism,” a jurisprudence that emphasized the impor-
tance of maintaining harmony between the states. See Paul Finkelman, Story 
Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph 
Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247, 248−52; Gates, supra 
note 9, at 993. 
 23. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 4, at 197−98. 
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she faithfully interprets a law with which she profoundly dis-
agrees. Recognizing that her role is different from that of a 
lawmaker, she exhibits respect for the democratic process that 
creates the law, even when she has no respect for the particular 
law. The judge’s steadfast adherence to her limited role upholds 
the rule of law. 
An alternative view is that judges who enforce immoral 
laws are derelict in their responsibilities as moral actors. They 
are the judicial equivalents of Hitler’s willing executioners.24 
Confronting slavery—the most important human rights issue of 
their time—abolitionist judges had power to ameliorate some of 
its effect, but instead, most caved. Their formal adherence to 
their legal role not only blinded them to justice but also eroded 
their humanity. 
Which evaluation is correct, or is there a middle ground 
which situates the judge who applies unjust law somewhere be-
tween heroic and detestable? To say that the answer depends 
on one’s personal views about morality diminishes the impor-
tance of the question. The moral-formal dilemma did not disap-
pear with slavery. Judges still register strong moral objections 
to some laws. Their choices about how to respond to such laws 
have important consequences for justice, democracy, and the 
legitimacy of courts. 
Faced with the same conflict between law and morality as 
Story and Shaw, anti-slavery jurors sometimes refused to con-
vict people for helping slaves escape.25 These jurors’ moral 
analysis might have been instructive to judges, but legally they 
had a different, and greater, ability to subvert the law. Juror 
verdicts of acquittal are not subject to appellate review.26 
Judges who flagrantly violate the law are, on the other hand, 
likely to be reversed. The judge who wishes to subvert law must 
proceed more covertly. In the next Parts, I explain how modern 
day judges do this and when judicial subversion is the ethically 
correct choice. 
 
 24. See generally DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECU-
TIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST 388 (1996) (“[Some Ger-
mans] who inwardly shrank from being cruel felt compelled to dissemble bru-
tality in order to conform to the prevailing ethos.”).  
 25. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 64 (1994). 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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II.  SUBVERSIVES AT WORK   
Subversion is not simply a historical artifact. There are 
subversive judges today, as well as scholars who advise judges 
to engage in subversion. In this Part, I expose some of them. I 
identify some examples of judges who, an objective review of 
their cases reveals, likely misrepresented their views of the law 
in order to achieve a particular result. These judges almost cer-
tainly would dispute the claim that they have acted subver-
sively. Reasonable inferences based on the public records in 
these cases may persuade the reader otherwise. 
A. CREATIVES VERSUS SUBVERSIVES 
There is a difference between creative judging and subver-
sion. The difference depends on the mind-state of the judge. 
When a judge engages in creative judging, she believes that she 
is right on the merits, even if her position is not supported by 
precedent or other traditional authority. The creative judge 
may acknowledge that an issue is uncertain or in a state of 
flux. She may even welcome review by a higher court, because 
she believes in the legal correctness of her position.27 
One example of “creative judging” may have occurred in 
United States v. Leviner.28 U.S. District Court Judge Nancy 
Gertner believed that a sentence mandated by the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines was too high.29 The guidelines required a 
greater sentence if the defendant had prior convictions.30 In 
Leviner, Gertner refused to credit some of the defendant’s prior 
convictions because she found that they were the result of ra-
cial profiling.31 She wrote a long opinion in which she explained 
 
 27. Alternatively, a creative judge may hope her opinion will not be ap-
pealed because she fears the higher court would not agree with her interpreta-
tion of the law. U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Stephen Reinhardt, 
for example, often writes opinions that seem different from where a majority 
of the Supreme Court would come out on the same issue. See Matthew Rees, 
The Judge the Supreme Court Loves to Overturn, WKLY. STANDARD, May 5, 
1997, at 27, 27−29. Noting that the Supreme Court grants certiorari in only a 
small number of cases, Reinhardt reportedly has said, “They can’t catch ’em 
all.” Id. at 29. 
 28. 31 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 29. Id. at 25. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 33; see also Patricia Nealon, US Judge Acts to Counter Bias in 
“Stops,” BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 1998, at B1 (“[Gertner] found that Leviner’s 
long rap sheet . . . reflected the fact that he, as a black man, was more likely to 
be stopped by police and prosecuted for motor vehicle violations.”). 
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why she believed her analysis was supported by the guide-
lines.32 
The subversive judge, as opposed to the creative one, be-
lieves that the outcome she desires is unsupported by law. She 
pretends otherwise, however. In this sense her opinion is a lie. 
If she is a trial judge, she makes findings of fact to insulate her 
decision, to the extent that she can, from appellate review.33 If 
she is an appellate judge she cloaks her analysis in the lan-
guage of precedent and statutory interpretation. She tries to 
proceed under the radar, hoping that attention will not be paid 
by higher courts. Subversive judges are double agents. Every-
one thinks they work for law, but their true boss is justice. 
It is impossible to know with certainty when a judge is be-
ing creative rather than subversive. The difficulty of proving an 
actor’s mind-state is a common problem in U.S. law, where a 
criminal or tort case can turn on a fact finder’s determination of 
the level of intent.34 In such cases there is rarely direct evi-
dence—the fact finder must rely on circumstantial evidence 
and her common sense. The same tools can help us try to dis-
tinguish between creatives and subversives, although I will 
concede that, at the end, no one but the judge knows for sure. 
B. HARD CASES VERSUS EASY CASES 
Subversion is a liberal, not radical, tool because it is based 
on faith in the rule of law.35 It posits that there are “correct” 
and “incorrect” answers to legal controversies, and that these 
answers can be determined in a scientific fashion by applying 
jurisprudence. Subversion is required when the correct legal 
response conflicts with the correct moral response.36 When 
 
 32. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 25−39. 
 33. See KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 368 
(1987); see also M.B.E. Smith, May Judges Ever Nullify the Law?, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1657, 1660 (1999) (“Judges most easily exercise this power [to 
nullify the law] when they make findings of fact, which rarely are disturbed or 
even closely examined by appellate courts.”). 
 34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962). 
 35. See Paul Butler, Should Radicals Be Judges?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1203, 1204 (2004) (“Generally speaking, legal radicals do not believe in the 
rule of law.”). 
 36. See M.B.E. Smith, Do Appellate Courts Regularly Cheat?, CRIM. JUST. 
ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1997, at 11, 11 (“Somewhat surprisingly, the first ques-
tion—do courts often cheat?—is the least tractable. It assumes a controversial 
jurisprudential hypothesis, namely, that at least some propositions of law 
have a determinate truth value. (If none do, then there is nothing for courts to 
follow, no way that they could cheat. . . . So one might, quite reasonably, block 
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judges decide law in “hard” cases, they do not act subver-
sively.37 Those cases are hard because the law is uncertain, and 
thus a judge’s moral intuition can be synthesized with the 
law.38 The “easy” cases are the ones that will require cheating. 
In those cases, the judge’s interpretation of the law leads her to 
a morally unsettling result, but one that she believes is legally 
correct. 
If there are any “radical judges,” their jurisprudence re-
lieves them of the burden of subversion.39 They do not believe 
that the rule of law is possible or that there are right or wrong 
answers to legal questions.40 When I would describe a judge as 
acting subversively, the radical judge would say that she is 
simply aware of the political nature of her work in a way that 
other judges pretend not to be aware.41 
“Radical judge” must, however, be an oxymoron.42 It is in-
teresting, then, that some non-radical judges believe that they 
must occasionally lie or twist or cheat in order to achieve the 
legal outcomes that they desire. In the next Subpart, I provide 
examples of judges who I believe have intentionally subverted 
 
my first question (Do courts often cheat?) by saying, ‘Courts can’t cheat be-
cause they are not bound by anything at all.’”). 
 37. H.L.A. Hart wrote, “Whichever device, precedent or legislation, is cho-
sen for the communication of standards of behaviour, these, however smoothly 
they work over the great mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point where 
their application is in question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has 
been termed an open texture.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124 (1961). 
 38. Dan Solove has observed, “When judges have discretion, they have the 
freedom to decide the case according to their own will, intuitions, and values. 
Thus, according to the positivists, the rule of law does not extend to hard 
cases.” Daniel J. Solove, Postures of Judging: An Exploration of Judicial Deci-
sionmaking, 9 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 173, 176 (1997); see also Alex 
Kozinski, The Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1100 
(2004) (“Let me now turn to the issue that has been alluded to several times 
already by Professors Fried, Freedman and Butler, among others. I’m talking 
about the cases where a dispassionate application of the law to the facts leads 
to a result that the judge doesn’t like. I want to put aside the close case where 
the law is murky enough so the judge might find a principled way to reach a 
result he considers just.”). 
 39. See Butler, supra note 35, at 1212 (noting the absence of radical 
judges). 
 40. See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A 
Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 519−20 (1986) (discussing 
how, in a hypothetical case, a judge might start with an outcome that he 
wants to reach and then find a “legal” way to reach that outcome); Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
561, 665−73 (1983). 
 41. See Butler, supra note 35, at 1204. 
 42. See id. at 1213. 
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the law and scholars who have encouraged these judges. I do 
not approve of every example of subversion that I describe, nor 
do I intend these to be examples of judges who are subverting 
for moral reasons.43 Later this Article suggests methods to dis-
tinguish between “good” and “bad” subversion. My purpose is 
simply to demonstrate that judges subvert more frequently 
than they or scholars commonly acknowledge. I have purposely 
included examples of both liberal and conservative judges, to 
demonstrate that subversives are not limited to any political 
party or cause. 
C. SUBVERSIVE STORIES44 
1. Magistrate Judge Kathleen Kennedy-Powell  
The most common judicial subversion occurs in criminal 
courtrooms. Judges often pretend to believe police officer testi-
mony about how evidence was obtained if the cost of not believ-
ing the police is exclusion of important evidence. 
An example of this kind of subversion occurred in the O.J. 
Simpson case.45 Simpson was accused of murdering his ex-wife 
and another person outside of his ex-wife’s home.46 Simpson 
moved to suppress a blood-stained glove and other evidence 
that Detective Mark Fuhrman claimed to have found on Simp-
son’s property.47 The glove was especially probative evidence 
 
 43. Subversion can be used in the service of morality, or it can be used to 
achieve political ends. Recognizing that the line between the two is not bright, 
I praise only the first use. As I discuss below, disagreement with the law on 
public policy grounds—as opposed to moral grounds—does not justify subver-
sion. 
 44. Several of these cases involved contested facts. Further, judge selec-
tion procedures often make it difficult for the public to be aware of a judge’s 
moral or political position on various issues unless the judge chooses to discuss 
these issues. In these case studies, I have tried to make reasonable inferences 
about the judge’s moral or political views based on public records. I concede 
that it is difficult, especially in contemporary cases, to know judges’ motives. 
For example, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), would be an example of crea-
tive judging if the Justices who wrote opinions in favor of Bush actually be-
lieved in the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause they asserted. It 
would be an example of subversion if those Justices did not believe in the legal 
merits of Bush’s case but so pretended in order to resolve the case. 
 45. People’s Response to Defendant’s Motion To Exclude Evidence of Do-
mestic Violence at 2, People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 
15, 1994), 1994 WL 737964. 
 46. See id. 
 47. Simpson Preliminary Hearing, Day 5, Part 1 (CNN television broad-
cast July 7, 1994) [hereinafter Simpson Hearing]. 
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because a matching glove had been found at the murder 
scene.48 
Simpson’s motion to suppress was based on the fact that 
the police had not obtained a warrant for the search.49 The 
prosecution defended the search on the ground that there was 
an “exigent” circumstance which, under Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence, creates an exception to the warrant requirement.50 
Detectives Mark Fuhrman and Philip Vannatter testified that, 
after responding to the murder scene, they went to Simpson’s 
home because they wanted to make arrangements for someone 
to take care of the couple’s children, who were in Mrs. Simp-
son’s apartment.51 When they arrived at Simpson’s property, no 
one appeared to be home.52 They became concerned, they testi-
fied, when they saw blood on Simpson’s car.53 They said that 
they thought that he might have been the victim of foul play as 
well, and they entered his property out of concern for safety.54 
They claimed that Simpson was not a suspect at the time of 
search, even though they were aware that Simpson had as-
saulted his ex-wife on previous occasions, and even though a 
spouse or former spouse is a usual suspect in a murder case.55 
Judge Kennedy-Powell credited the officers’ testimony and 
denied the motion to suppress. She said her ruling was based 
on “the officers’ . . . state of mind,” their “specific actions,” and 
“the experience of those officers in drawing their conclusions.”56 
She found that the police officers were “acting for a benevolent 
purpose in light of the brutal attack and that they reasonably 
believed that a further delay could have resulted in the unnec-
essary loss of life.”57 
A number of commentators were suspicious of Judge Ken-
nedy-Powell’s good faith. Criminal procedure scholar Wayne 
LaFave noted that “most people have responded [to the notion 
 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id.; see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392−93 (1978) (“[A] 
warrantless search must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which jus-
tify its initiation.” (citation omitted)).  
 51. Simpson Hearing, supra note 47. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id.  
 56. Transcript of Ruling Denying Motion to Suppress Evidence, L.A. 
TIMES, July 8, 1994, at A25. 
 57. Id. 
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that the police officers did not suspect Simpson] with a fair de-
gree of incredulity.”58 Stanford Law Professor George Fisher 
stated that “no one can believe” that Simpson was not a suspect 
at the time of search.59 Defense attorney Harvey Silverglate 
wrote that, “[f ]or the detectives to have denied that Mr. Simp-
son was a suspect at the time of the entry, and for Judge Ken-
nedy-Powell to have pretended to believe them . . . showed how 
the fact-finding process gets skewed in order to preserve the 
admissibility of probative evidence.”60 
Commentators have used the Simpson suppression hearing 
as an example of the willingness of judges to subvert the law in 
criminal cases in order to thwart application of the exclusion-
ary rule. Author Scott Turow wrote that the fact that Judge 
Kathleen Kennedy-Powell credited the officers’ testimony “is 
scandalous. It is also routine.”61 Professor Morgan Cloud re-
marked that the Simpson case “dragged the issue of police per-
jury out of the secluded corners of the justice system and into 
the realm of public debate. Although this public attention is 
unique[,] . . . the problem is old and certain to survive the cur-
rent media frenzy.”62 Professor Alan Dershowitz wrote (thirteen 
years before the Simpson trial, in which he was one of Mr. 
Simpson’s attorneys) that, “[m]ost trial judges pretend to be-
lieve police officers who they know are lying” and that “all” ap-
pellate judges know this and “yet many pretend to believe the 
trial judges who pretend to believe the lying police officers.”63 
In a study of Chicago criminal courts, Myron Orfield found 
that: 
The Courts [Study] respondents, including judges, also believe that 
judges may purposefully ignore the law to prevent evidence from be-
ing suppressed, and even more often, knowingly accept police perjury 
as truthful. When the crime is serious, this judicial “cheating” is more 
likely to occur due to three primary reasons; first, the judge’s sense 
that it is unjust to suppress the evidence under the circumstances of a 
particular case, second, the judge’s fear of adverse publicity, and 
 
 58. Wayne R. LaFave, Commentary, Over the Wall: A New Theory Regard-
ing Entry of the Simpson Compound, Oct. 15, 1994, 1994 WL 562135, at *1. 
 59. George Fisher, The O.J. Simpson Corpus, 49 STAN. L. REV. 971, 
981−82 (1997). 
 60. Harvey A. Silverglate, Courts Whittle Away the Fourth Amendment, 
NAT’L L.J., July 25, 1994, at A19. 
 61. Scott Turow, Op-Ed., Simpson Prosecutors Pay for Their Blunders, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at A21. 
 62. Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1314 
(1994). 
 63. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE, at xxii (1982). 
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third, the fear that the suppression will hurt their chances in judicial 
elections.64 
2. Chief Judge Rose Bird, California Supreme Court 
During Chief Judge Rose Bird’s tenure as chief judge of the 
California Supreme Court, sixty-one death penalty cases 
reached the court.65 Bird reportedly was personally opposed to 
the death penalty.66 She voted to overturn the death sentence 
in all sixty-one cases.67 
During Bird’s tenure, the California Supreme Court re-
versed more than ninety percent of the death sentences before 
it.68 In those cases in which the court affirmed death sentences, 
Bird always dissented, although she was never the lone dis-
senter.69 She was the only judge on the California Supreme 
Court, however, never to vote to affirm a single death penalty 
case.70 Professor Michael Moore wrote: 
It is clear that Bird strongly feels that the death penalty is every-
where and always an immoral and disproportional punishment. . . . 
What I do not respect, however, is the degree to which procedural er-
rors are invented in order to effectuate a moral judgment that can no 
longer find direct expression in a holding that would invalidate the 
death penalty.71 
Professor Moore believes that Chief Judge Bird had “taken the 
law into her own hands—and thereby stepped outside the judi-
cial role.”72 
Similarly, Professor Gerald Uelmen contended that: 
The approach of the Bird court in reviewing death penalty judgments 
reflected a norm of reversal, in which the court paid little heed to 
principles such as abstention, the substantial evidence rule, and the 
 
 64. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An 
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 83 
(1992). 
 65. Frank Clifford, Voters Repudiate 3 of Court’s Liberal Justices, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1986, at A1 [hereinafter Clifford, Liberal Justices]. 
 66. Mike Weiss, Goodbye to a Rose That Thrived in Every Climate, S.F. 
CHRON., Dec. 6, 1999, at A2 (describing Bird’s involvement with Death Pen-
alty Focus, an organization opposed to the death penalty). 
 67. Clifford, Liberal Justices, supra note 65, at A1. 
 68. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Review of Death Penalty Judgments by the Su-
preme Court of California: A Tale of Two Courts, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 237, 237 
(1989). 
 69. See Michael Moore, Op-Ed., Rose Bird Should Go: On Death Penalty 
She Has Taken Law into Her Own Hands, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1985, at B5. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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principle of harmless error. Doubts, particularly those involving 
choice of sentence, were resolved in favor of reversal because of the 
severity and finality of the judgments being reviewed.73 
Some observers have defended Bird’s jurisprudence. Pro-
fessor Erwin Chemerinsky stated that “in the vast majority of 
these death penalty cases there were egregious errors commit-
ted by the trial courts—as reflected in the fact that forty of 
sixty-one death penalty cases were unanimous and another six-
teen were either six-to-one or five-to-two decisions to reverse 
the death sentence.”74 Judge Bird herself stated that she had 
always “voted to reverse death sentences because defendants 
were denied essential constitutional protections during the 
course of trials or criminal investigations.”75 She claimed that 
her votes were based “on what the Constitution intends, what 
the history of a particular amendment is and what the case law 
has been over the years.”76 
In November 1986, Bird was subject to a retention election, 
and she was voted out of office, along with two other liberal 
members of the court.77 The campaign against Bird focused on 
what came to be known as Bird’s “box score,” which referred to 
her voting to overturn death sentences in sixty-one out of sixty-
one cases.78 
 
 73. Uelmen, supra note 68, at 239. 
 74. Erwin Chemerinsky, Evaluating Judicial Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1985, 1985−86 (1988). 
 75. Frank Clifford, Lone Justice: She’s Been Described as Compassionate 
and Vindictive, Warm and Intimidating, Highly Respected and Unqualified for 
the Job: In Search of the Real Rose Bird, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1986, at 12. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Clifford, Liberal Justices, supra note 65. 
 78. Id. Judge Edith Jones, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, may be the pro-death penalty equivalent of Judge Bird. Although Judge 
Jones’s “box score” has not been tabulated, her support for capital punishment 
is well-known. See Steve Lash, High Court to Be Given New Course?: Next 
President May Have Great Impact, HOUSTON CHRON., May 26, 2000, at A1 
(“Jones . . . is a well-respected jurist known for her support of the death pen-
alty.”). Jones gave a speech to government lawyers on how to expedite capital 
cases. David Kaplan, The Fryers Club Convention, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 1990, 
at 54. In Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950, 964−65 (5th Cir. 2000), vacated en 
banc, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001), she voted to affirm a death sentence for a 
defendant whose attorney slept through parts of the trial. This case was even-
tually overturned in Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 357 (5th Cir. 2001), in 
which Jones dissented. 
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3. Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit 
Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit, reportedly used his administrative 
power to prevent an en banc review of the University of Michi-
gan affirmative action case until two judges opposed to the pol-
icy became ineligible to vote on it.79 On May 14, 2001, Martin 
received the petition for en banc review.80 At that point eleven 
judges were eligible to vote on it.81 Martin delayed circulating 
the petition until October of that year, allegedly to prevent two 
anti-affirmative action judges from voting on the petition.82 In 
July, Judge Alan Norris, a Reagan appointee, took senior 
status.83 The Sixth Circuit subsequently voted five to four to 
uphold the policy.84 In a “Procedural Appendix,” dissenting 
Judge Danny Boggs wrote that the 
panel that considered this case . . . was not constituted in conformity 
with [the local Sixth Circuit rule regarding en banc review] or any 
other rule. . . . Under these circumstances, it is impossible to say what 
the result would have been had this case been handled in accordance 
with our long-established rules. The case might have been heard be-
fore a different panel, or before a different en banc court.85 
Two other judges castigated Judge Boggs’s dissent on the 
merits, and also because it might “undermine public confi-
dence” in the court.86 Judge Alice Batchelder answered those 
judges by stating, “[p]ublic confidence in this court or any other 
is premised on the certainty that the court follows the rules in 
 
 79. Charles Lane, Court Dispute in Affirmative Action Case Ruled Moot, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2003, at A2. 
 80. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 811 (6th Cir. 2002), aff ’d 539 
U.S. 306 (2003). Martin had been a member of the panel whose decision was 
the subject of the en banc review. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. at 813. 
 83. See id. at 812. 
 84. Lane, supra note 79. 
 85. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 810−14 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
 86. Judges Moore and Clay wrote separate concurring opinions. Id. at 734. 
Moore stated,  
The baseless argument of the “Procedural Appendix” is that the deci-
sions of this court are not grounded in principle and reasoned argu-
ment, but in power, and that the judges of this court manipulate and 
ignore the rules in order to advance political agendas. I am saddened 
that Judge Boggs and those joining his opinion believe these things. 
But, more importantly, I am concerned that my dissenting colleagues’ 
actions will severely undermine public confidence in this court.  
Id. at 752−53 (Moore, J., concurring). 
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every case, regardless of the question that a particular case 
presents. Unless we expose to public view our failures to follow 
the court’s established procedures, our claim to legitimacy is il-
legitimate.”87 
4. Judicial Recognition of Subversion 
A few judges have discussed cases in which they would be 
tempted to disregard the law in favor of their views. Two ex-
amples follow in which judges spoke hypothetically. Neither 
judge advocated lying nor admitted to having framed the law to 
achieve a particular result. What is striking, however, is the 
sympathetic light in which two currently sitting federal judges 
portray subversion. 
a. Judge Harry Pregerson, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, Confirmation Testimony 
Sen. Simpson: If a decision in a particular case was required by case 
law or statute, as interpreted according to the intent that you would 
perceive as legislative intent, and yet that offended your own con-
science, what might you do in that situation? 
Mr. Pregerson: Well, of course it’s a hypothetical question and life 
does not present situations that are that clear cut, but I think all of 
us, judges and lawyers, would be very pleased if the congressional in-
tent was clearly discernible. I have to be honest with you. If I was 
faced with a situation like that and it ran against my conscience, I 
would follow my conscience. 
Sen. Simpson: I didn’t hear, sir. 
Mr. Pregerson: I said, if I were faced with a situation like that, that 
ran against my conscience, disturbed my conscience, I would try to 
find a way to follow my conscience and what I perceived to right and 
just. Not that, I would not, it would mean I would act arbitrarily. I 
was born and raised in this country, and I am steeped in its tradi-
tions, its mores, its beliefs, and its philosophies; and if I felt strongly 
in a situation like that, I feel it would be the product of my very being 
and upbringing. I would follow my conscience. 
Sen. Simpson: So that would be a tough one for you in that situa-
tion? 
Mr. Pregerson: Yes, sir. 
Sen. Simpson: Let’s say a decision in a particular case seemed to re-
quire, by case law or statute, and yet was inconsistent with what you 
believed might be the values of contemporary society; what might you 
do? 
Mr. Pregerson: I would seek to distinguish that case.88 
 
 87. Id. at 815 (Batchelder, J., dissenting). 
 88. Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearing Before Comm. 
BUTLER_5FMT 6/15/2007 10:53:19 AM 
2007] WHEN JUDGES LIE 1801 
 
b. Judge Alex Kozinski, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit 
At a symposium on judicial ethics at Hofstra Law School, 
Judge Kozinski discussed some cases that he described as hav-
ing “easy” legal answers but where knowing whether a judge 
should follow the law was difficult. Judge Kozinski said, “In 
theory, it’s easy enough to say that a judge may never bend the 
rules to avoid a particular result, no matter how bad. But con-
sider [these examples].”89 One example involved the release of a 
child molester, when there was reason to believe that he would 
assault another child, but when he had a legal right to be 
free.90 The other hypothetical case involved a convicted killer 
for whom there was legally sufficient evidence of guilt, but 
whom a judge believed had been wrongly convicted.91 Kozinski 
said: 
  I used to think that questions like these had an easy answer—you 
apply the law conscientiously and don’t worry about the conse-
quences. But I’m no longer sure. I now wonder whether this isn’t false 
modesty, a kind of hubris: I will accept whatever result the law calls 
for, no matter how much it hurts somebody else. A troubled con-
science is certainly not pleasant, but the real-life, brutal consequences 
of an unjust judicial decision are suffered by others—the innocent kid 
who wastes his life in a prison cell, or the future victims of the slasher 
released on a technicality. 
  I am reminded that among the most reviled participants in the 
Third Reich’s persecution of Jews and other minorities were the Ger-
man judges who enforced the Nuremberg laws. These judges claimed 
as justification that they were simply applying the law. Our collective 
assessment seems to be that the judges shirked their responsibility—
that they should have used their power and authority to undermine 
unjust laws. Do American judges have a similar ethical obligation? 
I’m not going to suggest an answer here because it’s a tough ques-
tion.92 
5. Subversive Scholars 
Two prominent scholars have written about serious ethical 
problems posed for judges by the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines. Under the guidelines, a judge must make factual deter-
 
on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 450 (1980) (statements of Sen. Alan Simpson, 
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, and J. Henry Pregerson, U.S. Circuit J., 
Ninth Circuit). 
 89. Kozinski, supra note 38, at 1101. 
 90. Id. at 1102. 
 91. Id. at 1101. 
 92. Id. at 1102. 
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minations that can have the effect of adding or subtracting 
years of punishment in a particular case.93 These scholars have 
described how a judge might subvert in cases in which the 
guidelines required punishment that seemed, to the judge, ex-
cessive.94 
a. Professor Albert W. Alschuler, University of Chicago Law 
Review 
In the following passage, Professor Albert W. Alschuler de-
scribes the practice of some judges, and other participants in 
the sentencing process, of misrepresenting facts in order to 
make the sentence shorter. 
Federal judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation officers 
sometimes have found an easier way to avoid the imposition of uncon-
scionable sentences. They have discovered that “creative interpreta-
tion” of the guidelines can outflank reform rhetoric and afford them 
substantial discretion. The guidelines’ provisions concerning the de-
gree of an offender’s involvement in the offense and the extent of his 
or her cooperation with the government have proven particularly pli-
able. The style of Henry David Thoreau and Martin Luther King, Jr. 
is not the style of most criminal justice officials; their civil disobedi-
ence usually is less public. They are unlikely to recognize it as civil 
disobedience at all and may call it “being realistic.”95 
The actual judicial equivalent of civil disobedience, as dis-
cussed extensively in the next Part,96 is judicial “nullification,” 
which was the second of the four choices that Robert Cover de-
scribed when judges face a conflict between law and morality. 
Civil disobedience requires a degree of transparency and will-
ingness to accept sanctions that are not present in the practice 
that Alschuler identifies. One understands why a judge who be-
lieved the law required “unconscionable” punishment would 
look for an effective way around the law; open defiance in the 
form of traditional civil disobedience would be ineffective be-
cause it would probably be reversed.97 Alschuler, however, 
seems to underestimate judges when he says that they would 
not “recognize” their disobedience to the law. “Being realistic,” 
which is how he believes judges would term their subversion, 
 
 93. See 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 1B1.3 (2006). 
 94. These articles were written before recent Supreme Court decisions 
that give judges more discretion to depart from the guidelines. See United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005). 
 95. Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for 
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 924−25 (1991). 
 96. See infra Part III. 
 97. See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 134 F.3d 404, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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seems a bizarre way to describe an action specifically designed 
to thwart the will of the legislature. 
b. Professor Daniel Freed, Yale Law Journal 
Professor Daniel Freed, in an article in the Yale Law Jour-
nal, describes three choices that a federal judge has when she 
believes that a mandatory sentence is unjust. The judge can  
(1) comply with the guideline; (2) decide to challenge the sys-
tem openly; or (3) “decide to avoid the formal system.”98 The 
third option is accomplished by accepting plea bargains even 
when the judge believes that the result is different from what is 
required by the guidelines. Freed observes that: 
When the gap between a guideline sentence and a just sentence is 
small, most judges are likely to choose the first option and follow the 
guideline, for the norm of courts is to follow the rules. As the gap be-
tween the Commission’s guidelines and a judge’s concept of just pun-
ishment widens, the degree of disrespect, noncompliance, and dispar-
ity is bound to increase, and the judge may more often choose the 
second option, formal challenge, or the third option, informal avoid-
ance. When the gap becomes very wide, more and more decisionmak-
ers—prosecutors, probation officers, and judges—will opt for the just 
sentence because they are all sworn to do justice.99 
Like Alschuler’s phrase “being realistic,” Freed’s “informal 
avoidance” is a euphemism for subversion. Freed suggests that 
judges recognize that the law may present varying degrees of 
injustice and that when they perceive that the injustice is 
slight, they are likely to follow the law. Judges, in his view, are 
more likely to proceed covertly when injustice is greater.100 
This seems an implicit recognition of the futility of “formal 
challenge,” which for judges would be open defiance of the law. 
If Freed is correct, the perception of judges seems to be that in 
cases of “mid-level” injustice a symbolic (transparent) protest 
might be appropriate, but when the injustice of the law is mani-
fest, a non-symbolic and effective power play is a better re-
sponse. 
6. Weak Subversion 
Occasionally appellate judges cast their vote for instru-
mentalist reasons. I describe this form of subversion as “weak” 
 
 98. Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unac-
ceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1726 
(1992). 
 99. Id. at 1726−27 (footnote omitted). 
 100. See id. 
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when it has no impact on the result in a case. The outcome has 
already been determined (by the votes of other judges), so the 
judge’s act is symbolic. It is subversive, however, because the 
judge does not actually endorse the view that her vote connotes. 
One example of weak subversion occurred in Brown v. 
Board of Education.101 Chief Justice Earl Warren had intensely 
lobbied his fellow Justices for a unanimous opinion.102 The most 
recalcitrant was Stanley Reed, who planned to dissent.103 Ac-
cording to a recent book on the case, Warren 
approached Reed, displayed a concern with the sensitivities of the 
south, and wondered aloud whether the country’s interests were bet-
ter served by unanimity in the face of predictable opposition, rather 
than an individual opinion that might encourage southern recalci-
trance. Reed conceded, agreeing to join the majority. Later on [Jus-
tice] Frankfurter would thank Reed for making the decision unani-
mous: “As a citizen of the Republic, even more than as a colleague, I 
feel deep gratitude for your share in what I believe to be a great good 
for our nation.”104 
Another weak form of subversion occurs in cases in which 
the line between creative judging and subversion is thin in-
deed. Below I describe two scholars who encourage interpreta-
tions of law that, in practice, seem only marginally different 
from subversion. These cases involve the death penalty and 
abortion, two issues that, for some judges, carry the same 
moral imperatives as the slave cases of two centuries ago. 
In “Death’s Casuistry” Professor Robert Tuttle addresses 
the moral conflict faced by Catholic judges in death penalty 
cases.105 Some judges believe that observant Catholics have a 
legal duty to recuse themselves in those cases. Tuttle states 
that abolitionist judges need not recuse themselves from decid-
ing death cases because, very technically, the result is not a 
foregone conclusion. The Catholic Church allows death as pun-
ishment in some cases, even though they are “‘very rare, if not 
practically non-existent.’”106 Since the law grants the judge dis-
cretion about whether to impose death, “the judge’s bias toward 
 
 101. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 102. See, e.g., ROBERT J. COTTROLL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCA-
TION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 151−82 (2003). 
 103. See id. at 163, 173−76. 
 104. See id. at 176. 
 105. See Robert W. Tuttle, Death’s Casuistry, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 371 (1998). 
 106. Id. at 376−77 (quoting JOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE: EVAN-
GELIUM VITAE ¶ 56 (1995)). 
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life does not threaten the legal order; the law has given the 
judge the discretionary power that she exercises.”107 
The second example concerns Professor Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, who has described Roe v. Wade108 as a “lawless and 
immoral decision” that creates “the most atrocious injustice in 
American law since slavery.”109 Paulsen explicitly disavows 
“subversion of the rule of law,” but states that judges have a 
“moral imperative to resist Roe through every legitimate 
means.”110 In hard cases, he advises judges to use natural law 
principles to defeat abortion rights. He states, “the frequent 
lack of clarity in the law makes possible ‘ameliorist’ incre-
mental, temporary solutions at the margins of the moral-formal 
conflict: The judge may introduce his own sense of what ‘ought 
to be’ interstitially, where no ‘hard’ law yet exists.”111 
III.  THE INFERIOR ALTERNATIVES TO SUBVERSION   
Having identified several examples of judicial subversion, I 
will now recommend it in some cases. There is a way that 
judges can responsibly use their power to prevent extreme in-
justices, through the theory of ethical subversion I propose 
later in this Article. First, I explain why the alternatives to 
subversion, as described by Robert Cover, fail to satisfy these 
criteria.  
A. CHOICE I: APPLY THE LAW AGAINST CONSCIENCE 
This choice is sometimes characterized as admirable, be-
cause the judge sets aside her views in favor of the law.112 It 
was the choice made by Justice Story in Prigg v. Pennsyl-
vania113 and Judge Shaw in Thomas Sims’s Case.114 The result, 
it is worth repeating, was the enforced bondage of Margaret 
Morgan and Thomas Sims. A more recent example occurred in 
federal court in Manhattan. Judge Gerald Lynch was required 
to sentence an eighteen-year-old defendant to a ten-year man-
datory minimum sentence that Judge Lynch characterized as 
 
 107. Id. at 382. 
 108. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 109. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 35. 
 110. Id. at 37. 
 111. Id. at 50 (quoting COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 4, at 6). 
 112. Charles Fried, A Meditation on the First Principles of Judicial Ethics, 
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1227 (2004). 
 113. 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
 114. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 285 (1851). 
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“abhorrent,” “bitter,” and “unfortunate.”115 Judge Lynch ex-
pressed doubt that the “enormous penalty” would benefit either 
the defendant or society.116 During trial, Judge Lynch took the 
unusual step of granting the defense’s request to instruct the 
jury on the mandatory sentence that a guilty verdict would re-
quire.117 After the prosecution’s interlocutory appeal, the court 
of appeals reversed this ruling and ordered Judge Lynch not to 
reveal the sentence.118 The jury returned a guilty verdict, and 
Judge Lynch imposed the mandatory sentence, which he de-
clared to be “unjust and harmful.”119 The judge concluded his 
sentencing by telling the defendant “I wish I could do more for 
you.”120 
U.S. District Judge Nancy Gertner has discussed applying 
the law against conscience and then writing what she describes 
as an “oy” footnote, in which she registers her disagreement 
with the law.121 Other commentators also have recommended 
that judges apply unjust law but protest it at the same time.122  
The problem with this alternative is that it is virtually 
meaningless. The unjust law retains its coercive force upon a 
human being. It also seems, when the law is profoundly unfair, 
an unconscionable act. How could any responsible moral actor 
impose, as Judge Lynch did, punishment that he believes is 
“unjust and harmful”? 
When judges, after applying law they think is unjust, reg-
ister some kind of protest, there is little evidence that legisla-
tors care.123 U.S. District Judge Robert Sweet noted that when 
he has followed the law while objecting to its fairness, “the 
 
 115. Benjamin Weiser, A Judge’s Struggle to Avoid Imposing a Penalty He 
Hated, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, at A1. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. 
 119. Id. Judge Lynch “angrily denounced his own decision” and declared 
that this was “without question the worst case of [his] judicial career.” Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, To Speak or Not to Speak: Musing on Judi-
cial Silence, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1147, 1147−61 (2004). 
 122. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, Defense-Oriented Judges, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1483, 1501 (2004) (commending Judge Gerard A. Lynch for speaking out 
against an unjust application of mandatory minimum sentencing). 
 123. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITI-
CAL PROCESS 169 (1980) (arguing that courts have a limited quantitative abil-
ity to challenge the legislature). 
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earth has not shaken as a consequence. Nor has it improved my 
feelings, or those of the defendant, on the issue.”124 
The strongest defense of this choice is based on separation 
of powers doctrine. Ideally, elected legislators—not judges—
should make the law. Preserving this power for the most de-
mocratically responsive body is an important value. The value 
is not, however, absolute.125 It must be balanced against other 
important values, especially those that implicate human rights, 
including the rights to be free from slavery, genocide, and racial 
discrimination.126 
One might distinguish between cases in which judges con-
front law that they believe is immoral and those cases in which 
the law is only unwise. In a democracy, the people should have 
the luxury of establishing unwise laws, within limits. Supreme 
Court Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas both 
have criticized laws for being poor public policy, but have voted 
to enforce them anyway, on constitutional grounds.127 If that is 
the extent of their discontent with the laws, I think the Justices 
acted properly. 
B. CHOICE II: APPLY CONSCIENCE AND BE FAITHFUL TO THE 
LAW 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to apply the Fugi-
tive Slave Law,128 as did an Ohio probate judge.129 U.S. District 
Judge Robert Sweet has said that his moral opposition to the 
 
 124. Robert W. Sweet, The Judge’s Dilemma: Duty or Conscience?, 19 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1041, 1045 (1997). 
 125. Id. at 1045 (explaining that a judge’s moral beliefs may require her to 
declare that performance of her oath is no longer possible because of the state 
of the law). 
 126. In Part V, this Article addresses concerns about separation of powers 
more fully. 
 127. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that Texas’s sodomy law, though constitutional, was “silly”); Su-
preme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Asso-
ciation Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html (criticizing the federal mandatory mini-
mum sentence regime). 
 128. See Dennis McCann, Slave Launched Battle Between State, Federal 
Governments: Wisconsin’s Refusal to Obey Fugitive Slave Law Landed News-
paper Editor in Jail, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 22, 1998, at 1, available 
at http://www2.jsonline.com/news/state/wis150/stories/0322sesqui.stm. 
 129. Cover, Book Review, supra note 2, at 1007 (citing 5 HELEN T. CATTER-
ALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 21−22 
(1937)). 
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death penalty would lead him to openly defy the law, if he ever 
got such a case.130 This is “judicial nullification” in the purest 
sense. (Cover called it “judicial civil disobedience.”)131 It is an 
act of conscience. It is also a dereliction of responsibility. 
Judges lack the power to nullify that jurors have—at least 
when judges make rulings of law. When judges act as fact-
finders in criminal cases they, like jurors, can nullify. When 
judges openly defy the law, they are likely to be reversed, and if 
they do so on a routine basis, they may be removed from the 
bench. 
Judge Sweet is a modern day abolitionist. He believes that 
the death penalty is immoral. When a judge’s morality conflicts 
with his interpretation of the law, Sweet recommends that the 
judge 
frankly state that the performance of his or her oath is no longer pos-
sible . . . as a matter of personal responsibility the judge should not 
enforce what is perceived to be an unjust result. . . . The judge must 
state that the enforcement is immoral and provide the basis of the 
perceived injustice along with the moral imperative—whether it be 
the Ten Commandments, John Rawls, the teachings of Buddha, or the 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.132 
Judge Sweet acknowledged that reversal might well be an 
anticipated result of his act, and that impeachment or censure 
is not entirely impossible.133 Thus, in the end, the act is sound 
and fury, signifying nothing. 
In United States v. Webb, for example, U.S. District Judge 
Stanley Sporkin refused to apply a sentence required by the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines because he thought the sen-
tence was unjust.134 Sporkin’s main objection was that the de-
fendant’s criminal conduct was solely explained by his addic-
tion to drugs, but this factor was excluded from his 
consideration under the guidelines.135 The court of appeals re-
versed, noting that the guidelines specifically rejected consid-
eration of addiction.136 The appellate court held that “Judge 
Sporkin not only abused his discretion in sentencing the defen-
dant[;] he did so knowingly . . . [and] he wreaked havoc in the 
 
 130. See Sweet, supra note 124, at 1044−45. 
 131. Cover, Book Review, supra note 2, at 1007. 
 132. Sweet, supra note 124, at 1045. 
 133. Id. 
 134. 966 F. Supp. 16, 17 (D.D.C. 1997). 
 135. Id. 
 136. United States v. Webb, 134 F.3d 403, 404−07 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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administration of justice in this case.”137 In an opinion recusing 
himself from the case, Judge Sporkin remarked, “the panel 
stated that the Court intentionally abused its discretion. To the 
contrary, this Court did what it was supposed to do—that is, 
render justice.”138 
Some judges engage in milder forms of nullification, in 
which they seem to openly defy the law, but calculate that their 
action will not be subject to judicial review. One example is 
U.S. District Court Judge Mary Johnson Lowe.139 A former de-
fense attorney, Judge Lowe thought that jurors should be told 
of their power to nullify. Under federal rules, however, jurors 
may not be so informed.140 Judge Lowe, instructing jurors on 
the burden of proof in criminal cases, would tell them that if 
they found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
they “may” convict him.141 The U.S. Attorney’s Office some-
times objected, asking the judge to say “must,” not “may.” 
Judge Lowe always refused. Because verdicts of acquittal are 
not subject to judicial review, however, she effectively insulated 
her own “nullification.” 
The courage of judges who are willing to put their careers 
on the line for their principles is admirable. Nonetheless, fun-
damental defects in the law warrant more than a symbolic re-
sponse. The more responsible practice is to prevent grave injus-
tice, for example, by writing a decision that will survive 
appellate review. 
 
 137. Id. at 408−09. 
 138. United States v. Webb, No. Crim. A. 94-0245, 1998 WL 93052, at *3 
(D.D.C. Feb. 20, 1998). 
 139. The Author served as a law clerk to Judge Lowe. 
 140. See Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 
253, 322 n.250 (1996) (comparing United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 
81, 85 (9th Cir. 1980), where the court did not overturn based on a jury in-
struction which stated the jury had the “duty to convict” if it found guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt, with United States v. Hayward, 420 F.2d 142, 
143−44 (D.C. Cir. 1969), where the court reversed based on a “must convict” 
instruction). 
 141. For an analysis of this issue in state law, see John Brunetti, Criminal 
Procedure, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 557 (1998), describing an attempt in 
New York to prevent nullification by changing form jury instructions from 
“may” convict to “must” convict. See also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF 
SELF-DEFENSE 159 (1988) (describing a behind-the-scenes battle about 
whether a judge should give an instruction describing the duty to convict to 
prevent jury nullification). 
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C. CHOICE III: RESIGNATION 
The Nuremberg laws demonstrate the extent to which in-
justice—even genocide—can be legal.142 Given the opportunity, 
should a judge have used his power to prevent the application 
of those laws? Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia believes 
that the answer is no. He wrote: 
  Maybe my very stingy view, my very parsimonious view, of the 
role of natural law and Christianity in the governance of the state 
comes from the fact that I am a judge, and it is my duty to apply the 
law. And I do not feel empowered to revoke those laws that I do not 
consider good laws. If they are stupid laws, I apply them anyway, 
unless they go so contrary to my conscience that I must resign. 
  But the alternative is not to do what is good or apply the law. The 
alternatives are to apply the law or resign because the law is what 
the people have decided. And if it is bad, the whole theory of a democ-
ratic system is that you must persuade the people that it is bad. I 
cannot go around—with respect to the Nuremberg laws, I would have 
resigned. But I would certainly not have the power to invalidate them 
because they are contrary to the natural law. I have been appointed 
to apply the Constitution and positive law. God applies the natural 
law.143 
Resignation is a response that various jurists have em-
ployed. Remember Judge John S. Martin?144 Judge Robert Ut-
ter?145 Judge Lawrence Irving?146 These judges all resigned to 
 
 142. The Nuremberg laws were passed in 1935 and were “designed to iso-
late Jews from participation in the civic life of the Reich, and to end sexual 
contact between Germans and German Jews.” Paul H. Haagen, A Hamburg 
Childhood: The Early Life of Herbert Bernstein, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
7, 21 (2003). These laws created two classes of German citizenship based on 
“German and generically related blood.” Id. The members of the second class, 
who included Jews, could not hold public office or vote. Id. at 22. The laws also 
forbade intermarriages between Jews and non-Jews. Id. 
 143. Antonin Scalia, Of Democracy, Morality and the Majority, Address at 
Gregorian University (May 2, 1996), in 26 ORIGINS 82, 89 (1996). 
 144. Judge Martin resigned from the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York. His reasons for resignation included an assault on the 
independence of judges through the use of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
and the Department of Justice’s intimidation of judges through the Feeney 
Amendment. See Arthur Price & Brian Kowalski, Note, Ethical Obligations 
Under the New Approach to Sentencing Guidelines, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
929, 934 (2004); John S. Martin. Jr., Op-Ed., Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31. 
 145. Judge Robert Utter resigned from the Washington Supreme Court be-
cause of his stance on the death penalty. Utter has been quoted as saying, “We 
continue to demonstrate that no human is wise enough to decide who should 
die.” Dale Turner, The Death Penalty Only Serves to Further Dehumanize So-
ciety, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 18, 2000, at D8. 
 146. Judge J. Lawrence Irving resigned from the U.S. District Court of the 
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protest laws that they thought were immoral. If you do not re-
member them, you see the problem with resignation. It is spit-
ting in the wind. 
The problem with resignation “is that [it] abandons the 
moral arena to judges who have no qualms about enforcing un-
just law.”147 Judge Robert Sweet noted, “For me, resignation or 
recusal abandons the field to those who lack the same convic-
tion and, of course, burdens one’s judicial brothers and sisters 
with the most troublesome of issues.”148 When judges resign to 
avoid grappling with unjust law, they surrender their power to 
remedy extreme injustice. This is complicity disguised as mo-
rality.149 
Subversion seems the best—if not the only—option for 
judges who are interested in using their power responsibly and 
effectively. At the same time, however, subversion entails sub-
stantial costs; those costs are considered later in this Article. 
The next Part makes the point that providing judges with lim-
ited authority to depart from rules is contemplated by several 
legal constructs and is not as radical as it may initially seem. 
 
Southern District of California. Judge Irving resigned because of his displeas-
ure over the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure 
of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 
925 (1991); Criticizing Sentencing Rules, U.S. Judge Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 30, 1990, at A22. 
 147. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 73 (describing Robert Cover’s view). In his 
book review, Cover noted that resignation was also the response urged by 
Ghandi and Thoreau. In both writings, Cover seems agnostic about the poten-
tial of resignation. Cover, Book Review, supra note 2, at 1006. On the one 
hand, he notes that “resignation enables the judge to abstain from becoming a 
cog in the machinery of state oppression while refraining from a willful viola-
tion of his oath to support and enforce the law as he believes the law to be.” Id. 
On the other hand, he observes that for many “resignation will appear to be an 
empty gesture.” Id. 
 148. Sweet, supra note 124, at 1045. 
 149. Lawyers also sometimes face the dilemma of resigning or participating 
in a system that they believe is corrupt. The National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers has advised its members not to participate in the military 
tribunal “trials” of persons suspected of terrorism, because its believes that the 
tribunals lack fundamental safeguards for accused persons. Diane Marie 
Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 333 n.308 (2004); see 
Nat’l Ass’n Criminal Def. Lawyers, Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 03-04 (2003), 
available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566d6000d 
aa79/ethicsopinions/$FILE/Ethics_Op_03-04.pdf (advising members that it is 
unethical to participate in military tribunals because the limitations placed on 
counsel make it impossible to render effective counsel).  
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IV.  RULES-DEPARTURE IN JURISPRUDENCE, 
COMPARATIVE LAW, AND LEGAL DOCTRINE   
In a democracy even limited judicial subversion seems, 
upon first impression, frightening. Why should one person’s—
even a learned judge’s—perceptions of justice be credited over 
those of a legislative body?150 It turns out, however, that some 
schools of jurisprudence already allow this kind of rules-
departure. It is also contemplated by the laws of some other na-
tions. Even the U.S. legal doctrine of “absurdity,” while not 
formally a rules-departure, allows judges to disregard the plain 
meaning of a law or statute. In this Part, I provide a short sur-
vey of this kind of judicial authority. My purpose here is to 
demonstrate that giving judges the power to occasionally de-
part from rules does not, in a democracy, lead to anarchy or to-
talitarianism. 
A. JURISPRUDENCE 
Robert Cover wrote that anti-slavery judges responded to 
“dissonance” between their morality and their legal interpreta-
tions by “retreat[ing] to a mechanistic formalism.”151 Formal-
ism is the idea that rules contain the answer to every legal dis-
pute, and that judges should decide cases based solely on the 
facts and the rules.152 In Cover’s view, however, formalism al-
lowed the abolitionist judges more flexibility than they realized. 
He believed that “the sorts of principles articulated as ‘fidelity 
to law,’ adherence to ‘authority,’ to ‘precedent,’ or to legislative 
or constitutional ‘intent’ seldom mechanistically compel a par-
ticular result in a given case.”153 
In Cover’s view, judges could have both followed the law 
and refused to enforce the fugitive slave acts. Rather than ig-
noring the law of slavery, judges simply should have “inter-
preted” it in a very progressive fashion. As I will explain later, 
 
 150. The moral theory of subversion proposed later in this Article relies on 
norms of justice from international human rights law. To that extent, ethical 
subversion requires a judge to consult more than her own precepts about mo-
rality. 
 151. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 4, at 232−36. 
 152. See Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 
151, 155−60 (1981) (“[L]egal disputes can be, should be, and are resolved by 
recourse to legal rules and principles. . . . Thus a formalist judge has an ex-
tremely limited set of materials to consider as relevant to his decision in a par-
ticular case—the rules and the facts. His decision is to be logically deduced 
from these two items alone.”). 
 153. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 4, at 232−33. 
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Cover’s recommendation seems tantamount to subversion, only 
the judge is supposed to be careful not to acknowledge what she 
is actually doing—not even to acknowledge to herself. It would 
have been difficult for a formalist judge, applying the law in 
good faith, to find major legal deficiencies with fugitive slave 
acts, especially when the U.S. Constitution itself provided for 
the return of runaway slaves. Under a “formal formalist” view, 
the pro-slavery interpretations of these judges were almost cer-
tainly correct. 
Not every adjudicative theory requires as strict adherence 
to rules as does formalism. Some theories of jurisprudence ac-
tually allow judges to choose justice when it conflicts with 
law.154 Natural law and pragmatism, especially, posit that 
moral considerations should be an important component of a 
judge’s decision making. 
Natural law views law as valid only when it is consistent 
with morality. Cover noted that “in the natural law tradition of 
slavery, the judge inherited a device for expressing the gap be-
tween the law as it is and the law as it ought to be.”155 Cover 
concluded, however, that the anti-slavery judges were so com-
mitted to formalism they were unwilling to invoke natural 
law.156 Ironically, some modern day jurists, notably Justice 
Clarence Thomas, seem more inclined to cite natural law than 
did most ante-bellum abolitionist judges. 
The jurisprudence of pragmatism also would have provided 
abolitionist judges with a way to undermine the law of slavery. 
The legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin describes pragmatism 
as the view that “judges should always do the best they can for 
the future, in the circumstances, unchecked by any need to re-
spect or secure consistency in principle with what other officials 
have done or will do.”157 Applying this principle to the fugitive 
 
 154. MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DIS-
OBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES 90 (1973) (“[T]he 
judge is indeed bound by the rules of law, and he is bound to administer jus-
tice through those rules. But sometimes the ends of justice may be disserved 
by following those rules. In those cases the judge’s role . . . extends him a lib-
erty to make this judgment and to depart from the rules to achieve results 
consistent with the ends for which his role is set up.”).  
 155. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 4, at 29. But see Christopher 
L.M. Eisgruber, Justice Story, Slavery, and the Natural Law Foundations of 
American Constitutionalism, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 273, 288 (1988) (arguing that 
anti-slavery judges actually employed natural law in interpreting the law of 
slavery). 
 156. See COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 4, at 34−35. 
 157. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 161 (1986). 
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slave cases, Dworkin believes that judges were not legally 
bound to find in favor of the slave masters. In a 1975 review of 
Justice Accused, Dworkin noted the judges “thought that the 
legislative policies in question violated the most fundamental of 
human rights. Why should they reject the competing idea that 
their formal responsibility as judges required that they protect 
individual right against misguided public policy?”158 
In Dworkin’s view, “law” is more expansive than written 
rules.159 He writes that “the law of a community consists not 
simply in the discrete statutes and rules that its officials enact 
but in the general principles of justice and fairness.”160 In the 
fugitive slave cases, Dworkin sees a conflict between this larger 
notion of law and the fugitive slave acts. He would have en-
couraged judges to disregard the law of slavery. Such an act 
would be based on “not simply the personal morality of a few 
judges, which they set aside in the interests of objectivity. They 
were rather, on this theory of what law is, more central to the 
law than were the particular and transitory policies of the slav-
ery compromise.”161 In effect, like naturalism, Dworkin’s prag-
matism would council antebellum judges to follow a higher law 
than slavery. 
Natural law and pragmatism would relieve the judge who 
faces fundamentally unjust law of the burden of subversion; 
rather, the judge should interpret the law in a way that makes 
it just.162 The practical result, however, of application of either 
of these theories and subversion is the same—the will of the 
legislature is thwarted and the force of the unjust law is 
 
 158. Ronald Dworkin, The Law of the Slave-Catchers, TIMES LITERARY 
SUPPLEMENT (London), Dec. 5, 1975, at 1437, 1437 (reviewing COVER, JUSTICE 
ACCUSED, supra note 4). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. Professor Roy Brooks elucidates Dworkin’s views as follows:  
Judges are permitted to make decisions outside established rules on 
the basis of principles but not policies, Dworkin argues. The judiciary 
should not simply be used as an instrument of society in the achieve-
ment of particular policy goals or in providing an efficient means to 
the achievements of those goals. Instead, the judge’s role in our lib-
eral, democratic state is to ensure that a community treats its mem-
bers in a principled, ethical manner. 
ROY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING FROM LEGAL 
FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 13−14 (2002). 
 161. Dworkin, supra note 158, at 1437. 
 162. But see Anthony J. Sebok, Note, Judging the Fugitive Slave Acts, 100 
YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1991) (arguing that Dworkin is mistaken in his belief 
that by applying his theory the judges that Cover considered would have 
reached a different result). 
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blunted. Perhaps endorsement of this kind of powerful judicial 
authority from a preeminent philosopher like Dworkin provides 
a measure of comfort to people who would fear subversive 
judges. Subversive judges are, in effect, no scarier than natural 
law or pragmatist judges.163 All three kinds of judges perform 
moral analysis and pursue the same objective of harmonizing 
law and justice. The difference is that natural law and pragma-
tist judges regard the setting aside of rules as a legitimate part 
of their interpretative powers. Subversive judges, who tend to 
be more formalist, would regard their act as apart from their 
normal process of adjudication. 
Most judges claim to follow more rules-bound theories of 
interpretation than either natural law or pragmatism.164 In 
Justice Accused, Cover admonished modern day judges for ad-
hering to the same rigid view of formalism as the antebellum 
judges. Yet Cover’s extremely elastic views on judicial interpre-
tation also raise serious issues. He wrote that “law,” “author-
ity,” “precedent,” and “legislative or constitutional ‘intent’ sel-
dom mechanistically compel a particular result in a given 
case.”165 The practical result of Cover’s proposal would be that 
the formalist judge responds to “cognitive dissonance” between 
law and morality by unconscious subversion. Rather than 
openly acknowledging that she is writing an opinion that is dif-
ferent from what the law requires, she tells herself that the 
outcome she seeks is supported by some legitimate interpreta-
tion. 
Some judges probably do subconsciously subvert. Judge 
Jack Weinstein, for example, claimed that judges who have 
strong moral objections to law need neither nullify nor subvert 
it, because of “the great flexibility of the American common law 
and its historical forms of interpretation.”166 In this view, there 
can never be a real conflict between law and morality because 
the rules can always be “interpreted” to be consistent with mo-
 
 163. I acknowledge that many judges and scholars register profound dis-
agreement with natural law. Critics of pragmatist judges are more muted. See, 
e.g., BROOKS, supra note 160, at 172 (noting that “most of our great judges 
have been judicial pragmatists”); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF 
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 240 (1999) (describing as judicial pragmatists Su-
preme Court Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, Frankfurter, Jackson, Doug-
las, Brennan, Powell, Stevens, White, and Breyer). 
 164. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 160, at 172.  
 165. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 4, at 232−33. 
 166. Jack B. Weinstein, Every Day Is a Good Day for a Judge to Lay Down 
His Professional Life for Justice, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 131, 145 (2004). 
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rality. This kind of ends-justified view of formalism ultimately 
seems more deceptive than subversion. The subversive judge, 
at least, is true to herself. 
B. COMPARATIVE LAW 
Some countries allow judges more flexibility in law-
morality conflicts than does the United States. It is interesting 
that the two most prominent examples are from nations that 
have experienced totalitarian regimes. In Germany, “adminis-
trative orders and regulations of a government agency may be 
nullified if they amount to a ‘gross violation of the laws of mo-
rality.’”167 In South Africa the “apartheid judiciary did not have 
the option to review and reverse unjust laws; rather, the court 
and all the other institutions had to implement and administer 
such laws.”168 In post-apartheid South Africa, however, “judges 
now have the duty to guard against the violation of human 
rights.”169 The new constitution discourages judges from “too 
readily accepting the legitimacy of a law.”170 
Both Germany during the Nazi era and apartheid South 
Africa had laws that now are widely understood to have been 
unjust. Those nations’ post-facto analyses seem to conclude 
that judges should have had more authority to prevent applica-
tion of those laws. In granting such extraordinary power to 
judges, it is likely that the risk that a judge might abuse this 
power was considered. In countries where memories of great in-
justice are fresh, however, it may be more obvious that the 
greater risk is not allowing a strong check on immoral law. 
C. THE DOCTRINE OF ABSURDITY 
The absurdity exception is a judicially created doctrine 
that exempts judges from following the plain meaning of a law 
if following it would lead to an absurd result.171 In Crooks v. 
Harrelson, the Court stated, “to justify a departure from the 
letter of the law . . . the absurdity must be so gross as to shock 
 
 167. Edgar Bodenheimer, Significant Developments in German Legal Phi-
losophy Since 1945, 3 AM. J. COMP. L. 379, 388 (1954). 
 168. Tholakele H. Madala, Rule Under Apartheid and the Fledging Democ-
racy in Post-Apartheid South Africa: The Role of the Judiciary, 26 N.C. J. INT’L 
L. & COM. REG. 743, 748 (2001). 
 169. Id. at 757. 
 170. See id. at 758. 
 171. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). 
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the general moral or common sense.”172 It must be clear that it 
was not the intent of Congress to have courts apply the statute 
in this way.173 
The doctrine of absurdity addresses a different problem 
than the moral-formal dilemma. It requires respect for the in-
tent of the legislature, even if not for the legislature’s drafts-
manship. 
A judge applying the absurdity doctrine does not subvert 
the law so much as try to make it more consistent with the 
lawmaker’s purpose. For this reason the doctrine does not pre-
sent the separation of powers issue that subversion does. I in-
clude it in this discussion of rules-departures only to make the 
minor point that even traditional legal doctrine allows judges to 
correct legislative bodies when they have made a procedural 
mistake that leads to an untoward result. The calculus of “ab-
surd” results requires some reliance on a judge’s moral intui-
tion. There is scant evidence that this power has been abused 
or that judges have used idiosyncratic, non-mainstream con-
structs of absurdity. This fact may provide some comfort as, in 
the next Part, I propose a moral theory of subversion that 
grants judges the authority to set aside some laws in the name 
of justice. 
V.  A MORAL THEORY OF SUBVERSION   
In cases in which application of law would result in ex-
treme injustice, judges should subvert the law. In other cases, 
they should refrain from subversion. This proposal obviously 
raises many questions, which I will try to address in this Part. 
At the onset, however, the reader should keep two things in 
mind. First, this theory, which reserves subversion for extreme 
cases, would limit rather than expand subversion’s present day 
practice. It would, for example, halt the most common kind of 
subversion—evasion of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule. Second, no judicial intervention against the will of a legis-
lature is likely to be cost-free. Most Americans probably would 
agree that the Supreme Court was correct to invalidate school 
segregation laws in Brown v. Board of Education.174 Still, they 
would have to concede that the Court’s actions created prob-
 
 172. 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930). 
 173. Treat v. White, 181 U.S. 264, 268 (1901). 
 174. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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lematic legal and political consequences175—consequences that 
have not yet been entirely resolved. My claim is not that sub-
version is a panacea; it is rather that judges should not be com-
plicit when the law goes horribly astray, as it did when it al-
lowed slavery. 
If my proposal for ethical subversion is followed, I do not 
think our system of law would be radically disrupted (in part 
because, as I have described, unregulated and unacknowledged 
subversion now occurs frequently). My argument is cautious 
and moderate. Thus I am assuming that the rule of law exists 
and that it is preferable that legislative bodies, as opposed to 
judges, “make” law. I intend to preserve those ideals but create 
some limited exceptions that would allow judges to (1) relieve 
the violent effect of unjust laws176 and (2) survive to judge an-
other day. 
A. PROCESS 
The mechanics of subversion are relatively simple. The 
subversive judge needs to be both outcome-determinative and 
crafty. This is easiest at the trial level, where judges often act 
as fact finders. In the manner of the subversive trial judges de-
scribed in Part II, the judge would make the kind of factual de-
terminations that lead to a just outcome. Appellate judges 
would have to interpret the law in a way that is both plausible 
(even though the judge does not think it is correct) and that 
supports the desired result. 
Duncan Kennedy, of Harvard Law School, has described 
how a judge might engage in this process.177 He writes, in the 
 
 175. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals 
and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 
(1976); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation 
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2−3 (1955); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawful-
ness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 428−30 (1960); Owen M. 
Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 
HARV. L. REV. 564, 564 (1965); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles 
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 22 (1959). 
 176. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1608 
(1986). Cover’s theory was that all laws, not just unjust ones, are violent. He 
wrote, “a judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, some-
body loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life.” Id. at 1601. 
 177. See Kennedy, supra note 40, at 527−28 (describing through his per-
sona as a judge, the six constraints on activist judges who want to do justice 
while facing a conflict between law and justice: “First, I see myself as having 
promised some diffuse public that I will ‘decide according to law,’ and it is 
clear to me that a minimum meaning of this pledge is that I won’t do things 
BUTLER_5FMT 6/15/2007 10:53:19 AM 
2007] WHEN JUDGES LIE 1819 
 
persona of a judge, 
the issue is how should I direct my work to bring about an outcome 
that accords with my sense of justice. My situation as a judge (initial 
perceived conflict between “the law” and how-I-want-to-come-out) is 
thus quite like that of a lawyer who is brought a case by a client and 
on first run-through is afraid the client will lose. The question is, Will 
this first impression hold up as I set to work to develop the best pos-
sible case on the other side? 
  . . . . 
  So it is an important part of the role of judges and lawyers to test 
whatever conclusions they have reached about the “correct legal out-
come” by trying to develop the best possible argument on the other 
side.178 
The subversive judge, then, simply adopts the best (plausi-
ble) legal arguments on the “justice” side of the law/justice con-
flict. She presents them as her own views, even though she 
does not actually agree with the interpretation of law. This is 
dishonest (later in this Part I situate the act in the tradition of 
“justified lies”) but nonetheless preferable to the alternative of 
following law that, in Kennedy’s view, makes the judge “an in-
strument of injustice.”179 
A judge willing to engage in ethical subversion should have 
some principled basis for choosing cases. There are two possible 
approaches to this issue: one, to leave it up to individual judges 
 
for which I don’t have a good legal argument. . . . [S]econd, various people in 
my community will sanction me severely if I do not offer a good legal argument 
for my action. . . . [T]hird, I want my position to stick. . . . [F]ourth, by engag-
ing in legal argument I can shape the outcomes of future cases and influence 
popular consciousness about what kinds of action are legitimate. . . . [F]ifth, 
every case is part of my life-project of being a liberal activist judge. . . . [S]ixth, 
since I see legal argument as a branch of ethical argument, I would like to 
know for my own purposes how my position looks translated into this particu-
lar ethical medium.”). 
 178. Id. at 522−23. 
 179. Id. at 558. In the conclusion to his article “Judge” Kennedy does not 
endorse a particular response by judges to conflicts between law and justice. 
Kennedy suggests that one alternative is, “[a]s the trial judge, I decide to pre-
tend to believe an account of the facts . . . that I know to be false . . . . This is 
obviously an extreme measure.” Id. at 559. Kennedy summarizes his analysis 
thus: 
[I]t is often argued that . . . the only permissible course of action for a 
judge confronting a conflict between law and how he wants to come 
out is always to follow the law . . . . I find this argument unconvincing 
. . . . [W]hether she should always follow the law in cases of conflict is 
a question that we answer as best we can through reflection and ar-
gument about our political system, about the actual laws in force 
within that system, and about particular cases. 
Id. at 559. 
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to decide (which is the approach that has been tacitly adopted 
now), or two, to develop a method of determining when a legal 
result is unjust enough to warrant the extreme response of 
subversion. The second approach is preferable because it would 
help prevent subversion by judges with idiosyncratic moral 
views. 
I propose that subversion be limited to laws that violate 
bedrock principles of international law. There are certain 
norms, known as jus cogens, which are so fundamental there 
can be no derogation. They apply to all states regardless of 
whether the state has signed a treaty. The principle of jus co-
gens is codified in the Restatement of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States as follows: 
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it 
practices, encourages, or condones 
(a) genocide, 
(b) slavery or slave trade, 
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, 
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment, 
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention, 
(f ) systematic racial discrimination, or 
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally rec-
ognized human rights.180 
These norms represent a broad consensus among nations 
as to the most fundamental rights. I have no illusion that in-
terpreting U.S. law under these principles is easy, but I think 
that it is possible for judges to do so in good faith. It is, after all, 
faith in their ability to interpret law that creates subversive 
judges in the first place. 
Under jus cogens, the law of slavery and the Nuremberg 
laws would have been grounds for subversion. Subversion of 
the exclusionary rule, on the other hand, would not be justified. 
Judges should subvert in a way that preserves their judi-
cial capital.181 This means that they should carefully choose 
their cases, based on the plausibility of their “lie” (i.e., their 
analysis of the case) and on the degree of injustice. To limit 
subversion they should only engage in it when applying the law 
results in an extreme injustice. The “macro” concern here is 
 
 180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 702 (1987). 
 181. CHOPER, supra note 123, at 161−64. 
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that the court’s legitimacy may be eroded if the public perceives 
too much subversion. The “micro” concern is that if an individ-
ual judge subverts too much, she might begin to lose her power 
as other courts look at her opinions with more scrutiny and 
view her decisions with less respect.182 
B. COSTS 
Subversion is a choice with some potentially troubling con-
sequences. I recommend subversion only because its conse-
quences are not as bad as the other options a judge has when 
she confronts unjust law. None of the risks of the ethical sub-
version I propose are perilous enough to justify judicial complic-
ity in the face of extreme injustice. Therefore, as the reader 
weighs the costs, she should keep in mind Margaret Morgan 
and Thomas Sims.183 She should ask herself, “[a]re these costs 
worth it, if their benefit is the emancipation of a human being 
from slavery?” If the answer is no, then the reader finds herself 
aligned with Justices Shaw, Story, and Scalia.184 She believes 
that judges should not use their power to prevent even the most 
extreme examples of injustice—slavery and genocide. She dis-
agrees with Judge Alex Kozinski who says that “[o]ur collective 
assessment seems to be that the [judges who enforced the anti-
semitic Nuremberg laws] shirked their responsibility—that 
they should have used their power and authority to undermine 
unjust laws.”185 
To keep from overestimating the costs of subversion, the 
reader should remember that this project is descriptive as well 
as normative. As explained in Part II of this Article, subversive 
judges are all around us.186 Thus, the analysis need not be con-
tingent on hypotheticals about what would happen “if ” judges 
started subverting the law. When the analysis is grounded in 
the real world we see that subversion is not a costless practice, 
but that it has not caused anarchy or fomented substantial 
backlash. 
 
 182. Rees, supra note 27, at 27. Matthew Rees describes Judge Stephen 
Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit as one of the most overturned judges in history: 
“A former Supreme Court clerk confirms that justices have privately referred 
to Reinhardt as a ‘renegade judge’ and have given his opinions extra scrutiny.” 
Id. 
 183. See supra Part I. 
 184. See supra Parts I, III. 
 185. Kozinski, supra note 38, at 1102. 
 186. See supra Part II. 
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1. Moral Costs 
Subversion is a form of lying. Lying is wrong—usually.187 
Some philosophers, including Augustine and Aquinas, forbid 
any lie.188 For Immanuel Kant, likewise, telling the truth is a 
categorical imperative.189 Many people, however, find an abso-
lute prohibition against lying unduly harsh. It would have re-
quired, for example, Anne Frank’s protectors to tell the truth if 
Nazi authorities asked if they knew of her whereabouts. Even 
the Bible seems to excuse some lies. Exodus, for example, con-
tains an account of Hebrew women who lied to Egyptian au-
thorities so that they would not have to obey an order to kill 
male babies.190 The women lied because they “feared God.”191 
The philosopher Anita Allen notes, “[m]ost contemporary 
philosophers who have taken up the subject of lying . . . have 
argued that the wrongness of lying is to some extent contingent 
upon the circumstances.”192 In some moral and religious tradi-
tions certain kinds of lies are justified.193 According to Allen, 
[t]he standard example of when this doctrine may apply is the situa-
tion in which a murderer comes to your door looking for someone you 
 
 187. It is also worth noting that lying is quite common. This does not mor-
ally justify lying but makes the discussion of it more realistic. In the words of 
Anita Allen: 
People lie all the time. Liars lie, but they are not alone. Ordinary peo-
ple who value and practice a high degree of honesty also lie. Some 
highly regarded professionals lie as a seeming requirement of their 
work. Physicians and nurses lie to patients to ease their distress. So-
cial psychologists lie to research subjects in studies of human behav-
ior. Law enforcement officials lie to criminal suspects to encourage co-
operation and collect evidence. Diplomats and government 
bureaucrats lie to gain advantage over foreign governments in inter-
national affairs. Lawyers lawfully conceal truths unfavorable to their 
clients, for indeed, in the adversary system, “the very institutional 
framework of a legal system may be used to hide the truth.” 
Anita L. Allen, Lying to Protect Privacy, 44 VILL. L. REV. 161, 165−66 (1999). 
 188. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 
pt. II, question 110, art. 3 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans. 
1911) (“[I]t is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something 
that is not in his mind . . . . Therefore every lie is a sin, as also Augustine de-
clares (Contra Mend. i).”). 
 189. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 15 
(James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 3d ed. 1993) 
(arguing that lying cannot be a universal maxim because from “[s]uch a law 
there would really be no promises at all,” which would consequently inconven-
ience the original author who personally willed a lie). 
 190. Exodus 1:15−22. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Allen, supra note 187, at 168−69. 
 193. Id. at 162. 
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know to be at home. When asked if the intended victim is at home, it 
is permissible to say that the intended victim is not . . . . The Catholic 
teaching is that you may lie or equivocate in this situation because 
the truth is sought by someone whose unjust intentions deny him or 
her the right to it.194 
Both the moral arguments against lying and the argu-
ments supporting justified lies implicate subversive judges. 
Lies are bad for society, according to philosophers, because they 
break down the trust required for civic life.195 In addition, the 
liar disrespects the dignity of the person to whom she lies; she 
does not allow that person to act rationally, based on the 
truth.196 
Subversive judges are subject to both these critiques. The 
specter of widespread lying by judges could erode the legiti-
macy of the courts and ultimately threaten the rule of law. For 
this reason, any moral theory of subversion should be restricted 
to narrow circumstances. It is also true that the judge who sub-
verts does not trust others to correct the immorality; this is 
why she takes it upon herself. She might argue that her lack of 
trust is justified. Nonetheless, one motivation for judges who 
apply law that they believe is unfair probably is the hope that 
their application will call attention to the injustice, and law-
makers will respond by changing the law. The subversive judge 
circumvents the potential of this outcome. 
A lie by a judge that has the result of freeing a human be-
ing from slavery might fit into the tradition of justified lies. The 
judge’s act is evil, because it is a lie, but it is less than the evil 
of slavery. In this view, judicial candor is a hallmark of a civil 
society, but it is not a categorical imperative. In limited circum-
stances, in the service of a higher good, a moral theory of sub-
version would permit judges to make “mental notes” against 
applying unjust law. 
2. Political and Legal Costs 
a. Democracy and Separation of Powers 
Judicial subversion is anti-democratic. It creates a short-
term benefit with a long-term cost. The subversive judge 
 
 194. Id. at 168. Catholic doctrine requires one who lies in a permissible cir-
cumstance to make a “mental note” where she silently notes the truth to her-
self. Id. 
 195. See id. at 169. 
 196. See id. 
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makes, rather than interprets, law after the democratically 
elected body has passed unjust legislation. 
My response to concern about the anti-democratic nature of 
subversion consists of four observations. First, some constitu-
tional values are more important than others. If there is a con-
flict between fundamental civil rights and the separation of 
powers, then the former should be accorded more respect.197 
Second, the existence of constitutional anti-majoritarian prac-
tices reveals that democracy is not an absolute value. The 
Equal Protection Clause, for example, also restricts what “the 
people” can do—even through democratic means.198 In inter-
preting this amendment, judges frequently confront tension be-
tween the ideals of majority rule and equal justice.199 
Third, the practice of democracy is not all or nothing. 
There are degrees of democracy. It is true that there is less de-
mocracy in a world with subversive judges, but there may still 
be “enough” democracy. Put another way, when the average 
citizen considers threats to popular governance, she probably is 
more concerned about loosely regulated campaign financing or 
election fraud than with subversive judges.200 With all its im-
purities, including subversive judges (both lawyers and lay per-
sons probably are more willing to acknowledge judicial subver-
sion than would be many judges or legal scholars), the United 
States’ practice of democracy is still sufficient for the citizen to 
believe that she lives in a free society, governed by “we, the 
people.” 
 
 197. Jesse Choper, making a similar calculus, also came out in favor of in-
dividual rights over separation of powers. See generally CHOPER, supra note 
123. 
 198. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 199. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 
5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 107−09 (1976) (discussing the structure and limita-
tions of the antidiscrimination principle that controls the interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
 200. One reason might be that subversive judges, unlike campaign financ-
ing, are not high-profile campaign issues. Indeed, Republicans and Democrats 
seem to have little success when they attempt to make a campaign issue of the 
appointment of “activist” judges (charged against Democrats by Republicans) 
or “right-wing, reactionary” judges (charged against Republicans by Democ-
rats). These issues have more currency in judicial elections (as opposed to elec-
tions for representatives in legislative bodies), but when subversive judges are 
defeated in these cases it may be because their subversion is too open, or be-
cause it is practiced indiscriminately—for example, to make “political” state-
ments as opposed to “moral” statements. 
BUTLER_5FMT 6/15/2007 10:53:19 AM 
2007] WHEN JUDGES LIE 1825 
 
Finally, the view of a rigid line between legislators who 
“make” the law and judges who “interpret” it is more a relic of 
high school civics than an accurate description of how the 
branches actually operate. As Judge Richard Posner writes: 
“Everyone professionally involved with law knows that, as 
Holmes put it, judges legislate ‘interstitially,’ which is to say 
they make law, only more cautiously, more slowly, and in more 
principled, less partisan, fashion than legislators.”201 
b. Line Drawing 
Judicial subversion should be limited, but limited to what, 
exactly? This Article suggests two broad limitations: first, that 
judges rely on jus cogens principles of international law and 
second, that they preserve their judicial capital. These limita-
tions still leave judges with considerable discretion.202 For ex-
ample, a judge might have to decide whether sentencing laws 
that punish crack cocaine offenses more severely than powder 
cocaine offenses constitute “systematic racial discrimination,” 
in violation of jus cogens.203 If she believes that such laws do 
represent an extreme injustice, she still must decide what to do 
in a particular case. She can try to prevent the defendant from 
 
 201. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 231, 235 (1995) (“When a con-
stitutional convention, legislature, or a court promulgates a rule of law, it nec-
essarily does so without full knowledge of the circumstances in which the rule 
might be invoked in the future. When the unforeseen circumstance arises . . . a 
court asked to apply the rule must decide . . . what the rule should mean in its 
new setting. Realistically, it is being asked to make a new rule, in short to leg-
islate.”).  
 202. Much depends on judges’ good faith in making the distinction between 
moral concerns and political concerns. To the extent that there is concern 
about a judge using subversion to enforce a non-mainstream construct of mo-
rality, the judicial selection and retention processes should help allay that 
concern. Judges typically seem not to hold political or moral views far outside 
of the mainstream. See Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH L. REV. 
1971, 1982−90 (1990). 
 203. See Lynette Clemetson, Judges Look to New Congress for Changes in 
Mandatory Sentencing Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at A12 (“Currently, 
possessing five grams of crack brings an automatic five-year sentence. It takes 
500 grams of powder cocaine to warrant the same sentence. Similarly dispa-
rate higher amounts of the drugs results in a ten-year sentence. The 100-to-1 
disparity, opponents of the law say, unfairly singles out poor, largely black of-
fenders, who are more likely than whites to be convicted of dealing crack co-
caine. At a sentencing commission hearing in November, Judge Walton, asso-
ciate director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy under 
the first President George Bush and a onetime supporter of tough crack co-
caine sentences, said it would be ‘unconscionable to maintain the current sen-
tencing structure’ on crack cocaine.”). 
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being punished at all, or she can attempt to reduce the crack 
offender’s punishment to what it would be if the offense in-
volved powder cocaine. The “judicial capital” limitation means 
that she acts only if her subversion is likely to be both unde-
tected and successful. 
The practical result of these limitations is that like cases 
will be treated differently. One crack defendant’s sentence 
might be subverted, and another’s not. This discrepancy might 
seem to occasion another kind of judicial unfairness, but the 
goal of the subversive judge is to remedy the effect of unjust 
laws when she can do so in a responsible way. This goal pre-
supposes that she will not be able to remedy all injustice, even 
in those cases that come before her. 
These are only examples of how subversion might proceed 
in some principled fashion if there were an open discussion 
about it. That discussion will not happen as long as judges and 
scholars largely pretend that subversion does not occur. Law-
yers, especially, acknowledge that subversion is commonplace, 
but because it is seen as shameful, there is no public debate 
about when it might be justified.204 
In sum, the line-drawing critique identifies some of the 
most difficult issues subversive judges face. It is, however, the 
least persuasive critique. It criticizes subversion on procedural 
or methodological grounds, as opposed to on its merit. It tells 
Margaret Morgan and Thomas Sims that they should remain 
slaves because judges will have to make hard choices in other 
cases that have nothing to do with them, or slavery. It is one 
thing to acknowledge the difficulty of drawing lines between 
degrees of morality. It is another—bad—thing to suggest that 
this difficulty should prevent moral judgments from being 
 
 204. Smith, supra note 33, at 1658. Smith continues: 
Kent Greenawalt has also discussed judicial nullification, albeit not in 
great detail. In Conflicts of Law and Morality, in the course of dis-
cussing the many techniques available to various legal actors for ame-
liorating the law’s usual rigor, he points out (what every practicing 
lawyer viscerally knows) that judges at every level have a de facto 
power to nullify the law, in both criminal and civil matters. Judges 
most easily exercise this power when they make findings of fact, 
which rarely are disturbed or even closely examined by appellate 
courts. But if a fact-finder has unfettered discretion, she may tailor 
her findings as she pleases. Hence, the law may effectively be nulli-
fied by a judge who knowingly plugs fictive facts into correct doctrine 
in order to obtain a particular result.  
Id. at 1659−60; see GREENAWALT, supra note 33, at 348−73. 
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made, when failing to make such judgments has horrific conse-
quences. 
c. Backlash 
Theoretically there is the potential of a backlash reaction 
to subversive judges, but only if judges are poor subversives. If 
the judge is clever, people should not realize that she is acting 
subversively—she will seem like a creative interpreter of the 
law, and perhaps she will be reversed more than some other 
judges, but her real agenda will not be suspected. 
What if word gets out? Some people fear a breakdown in 
the rule of law—every judge would do her own thing to spite 
the subversive judges. This seems unlikely, at least on a wide-
spread basis. Historically, principled subversion in other con-
texts does not seem to have inspired unprincipled subversion. 
Thus activist jurors in fugitive slave cases did not cause other 
jurors to subvert just laws. There are famous examples of “bad” 
jury nullification, including white supremacist jurors who ac-
quitted people guilty of crimes against civil rights workers, but 
those jurors were not motivated by “good” jury nullification.205 
They may not have even been aware of the good nullification. 
They would have nullified regardless. 
Likewise, there are judges whose legal decisions are moti-
vated by politics or even more sinister motivations.206 They ex-
ist in a separate moral universe from judges who subvert for 
principled reasons. The judge who subverts for principled rea-
sons risks outrage or sanctions, but probably does not cause 
unprincipled subversion. 
  CONCLUSION   
Judicial subversion is justified only when it thwarts pro-
foundly unjust law. In the previous Part I have demonstrated 
that principled subversion is not different in effect from other 
theories of adjudication that tolerate rules-departure. I ac-
knowledge, however, that encouraging judges to subvert the 
law in any case is startling, even if one concedes that judges 
 
 205. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the 
Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700−14 (1995) (discussing various 
rationales for jury nullification). 
 206. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 
432−33 (2004). 
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now frequently subvert without encouragement, guidelines, or 
any coherent theory. 
Ironically, subversion—an extreme tool—now is employed 
by many moderate judges. As an extreme tactic, it should be re-
served for extreme cases of injustice. 
When a judge considers how she should respond to unjust 
law, she must make difficult choices. Our system of government 
relies on trust in the good faith of participants in the justice 
system, especially judges. Honesty and transparency are im-
portant components of that good faith. These truths must be 
reconciled with another reality: the violent, dehumanizing force 
of injustice, especially injustice accomplished through the law. 
The law of slavery, for example, was evil. No judge ever 
should have applied law that had the result of enslaving a hu-
man being. If a judge had the power to free a slave, as a moral 
actor he should have done so, including—if necessary—by sub-
verting the law. Judges who failed to do so were complicit in 
one of the worst human rights abuses in American history. 
In his Letter from Birmingham Jail, Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. wrote, “[t]he question is not whether we will be ex-
tremists, but what kind of extremists we will be . . . . Will we be 
extremists for the preservation of injustice or for the extension 
of justice?”207 Conceding the complexity of the issues, and that 
no alternative is cost-free, this Article recommends that judges 
be extremists for justice. 
 
 207. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), 
reprinted in 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 835, 845 (1993). 
